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Controlling Diversion: How Can We
Convert the Toshiba-Kongsberg
Controversy into a Victory
for the West?
Jere W. Morehead *
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the revelations last year that a Toshiba Corporation subsidiary
illegally sold the Soviet Union tools to make superquiet submarine pro-
pellers, the United States government has struggled to develop an appro-
priate response for punishing the Japanese company.1 Unfortunately, the
proposals advanced by the United States have not been directed at using
this episode to advance meaningful reforms in both domestic and multi-
lateral export controls. This Perspective will examine the Toshiba-Kong-
sberg case, summarize the current state of export controls, and suggest a
strategy to improve upon the poor record of the West in controlling the
diversion of strategic technology to the Soviet Union and other commu-
nist bloc countries.
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, The University
of Georgia. The author acknowledges the able assistance of Al Barker Hill, his Research Assistant,
for contributions to the research and development of this Perspective.
I Members of the House-Senate Conference Committee on H.R. 3, the bill which would become
the Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988 ("H.R. 3" or "the Bill"), struggled to fashion a
legislative response to the revelations in the face of conflicting arguments involving national defense
and foreign and domestic economic policy considerations. 45 CONG. Q. 2813 (Nov. 14, 1987). The
bill ultimately passed both Houses of Congress in April 1988, before falling victim to a presidential
veto later sustained by the Senate. 134 CONG. REc. 7385 (June 8, 1988). The House revived the bill
and passed it with the mandatory sanctions in place. Langley, House Approves Huge Trade Bill by
Overwhelming 376-45 Majority, Wall St. J., July 14, 1988, at 3 col. 1. On August 23, 1988, H.R. 3
became law. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 1988 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News (102 Stat.) 1107 [here-
inafter Omnibus Trade Act]. The Act contains mandatory sanctions against COCOM violators. See
infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
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II. THE TOSHIBA-KONGSBERG CASE
During the past two decades, Toshiba Machine Co. ("Toshiba") 2
has manufactured and sold propeller milling machines.' Strategic goods
and technology, such as sophisticated milling machinery, are controlled
for export to communist bloc countries by COCOM,4 Japan,5 and the
United States6 export controls. These export controls seek to protect
Western security interests by impeding the acquisition of highly ad-
vanced technology by communist bloc countries.7
Toshiba embarked upon its journey down the slippery slope of ille-
gal export practices as early as 1974 when it lost a large Soviet order to a
French competitor after complying with the aforementioned export con-
2 In this Perspective, "Toshiba" refers to Toshiba Machine Co., an entity in which Toshiba
Corporation maintains controlling interest.
Toshiba Machine Co. is one of the largest manufacturers of machine tools in the world.... In
1986, its annual sales amounted to approximately seven hundred million dollars of which ap-
proximately one hundred twenty-two million resulted from sales to North American countries,
including the United States, and thirty-four million resulted from sales to communist bloc
countries.
LAW FIRM OF MUDGE, ROSE, GUTHRIE, ALEXANDER & FERDON, INVESTIGATION INTO SALES OF
PROPELLER MILLING MACHINES TO THE SOVIET UNION BY TOSHIBA MACHINE Co., LTD.: RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTORS OF TOSHIBA CORPORATION, 5 (1987) [hereinafter Re-
port] (available in the offices of Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.).
3 Report, supra note 2, at 9.
4 COCOM stands for the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. It is an
organization created in 1949 by the major Western nations (Japan and NATO, with the exception of
Iceland) to limit the flow of sensitive exports to prohibited nations. Berman & Garson, United States
Export Controls-Past, Present, and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 834-35 (1967). See Transfer of
United States High Technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc Nations: Hearings Before the
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong.,
2d sess., 95-929, at 157 (1982)[hereinafter Transfer of Technology Hearings](statement of James L.
Buckley, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance).
5 Japanese export regulations, reflecting COCOM controls, prohibit the export, without an ap-
proved export license, of any milling machine having more than three axes capable of simultaneous
numerical control. Machines with up to three axes capable of simultaneous control may be exported
as long as they are operated by numerical controllers not capable of controlling more than two axes
simultaneously. Report, supra note 2, at 11. Numerical controllers are devices which control the
movements of the milling heads. Receiving their instructions from perforated paper tape, the con-
troller directs the movements of each axis. Id. at 9.
6 See 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 (1987).
7 "The vigor of science and technology in the Western democracies and the greater economic
vitality of these nations in comparison to the Soviet bloc are sources of strength for the West in its
continuing effort to maintain its military security. The Soviet Union lacks these advantages; it seeks
to compensate for them by directing a substantial portion of its gross national product to the devel-
opment and production of military equipment and by making aggressive attempts to acquire and
apply Western technology to its military programs." NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NAT'L ACAD-
EMY OF ENGINEERING, INST. OF MEDICINE, BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST: U.S. NA-




trols.8 Since France is also under COCOM restrictions, Toshiba person-
nel concluded that export controls were more rigorously enforced in
Japan than elsewhere. Loss of that Soviet order led Toshiba officials to
deduce that violating COCOM prescriptions was the only available
method to compete successfully for Soviet business. 9
A. The First Sale
When Toshiba officials were approached by the Soviets again, in late
1979, Toshiba decided to enter into serious negotiations with the Sovi-
ets.1 ° The Soviets expressed interest in Toshiba's MBP 110 nine-axis
propeller milling machines during a January 1980 meeting in Moscow,
between a Toshiba salesman and representatives of Wako Koeki, a small
Japanese trading company, and Techmashimport, a Soviet import
agency. I
Toshiba initially responded by informing the Soviets that the MBP
110 could not be exported to a communist bloc country.1 2 Nonetheless,
Toshiba began investigating the possibility of temporarily modifying the
MBP 110 to evade the export restrictions and subsequently reconverting
the machines after shipment to the Soviet Union. 3 The Soviets sug-
gested that Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik ("Kongsberg"),14 a Norwegian
company, might be able to handle the reconversion and otherwise assist
Toshiba in the illegal transaction." Toshiba's President and its Director
of Overseas Sales subsequently joined their sales team in Moscow and
8 At that time, Toshiba received a query from the Soviets on the purchase of advanced propeller
milling machines. Having already sold the Soviets two propeller milling machines, with two-axis
simultaneous control, Toshiba offered additional machines of that capability and reminded the Sovi-
ets that export controls precluded the sale of "milling machines with more than two-axis simultane-
ous control. The Soviets, however, insisted that they required more 'sophisticated' machinery" than
Toshiba offered. Report, supra note 2, at 12. Toshiba personnel subsequently discovered that the
Soviets were able to obtain the more sophisticated equipment from a French company, Forest Line,
which sold them ten multi-axis propeller milling fhachines. During the installation of the Toshiba
nine-axis machines at a Baltic factory in Leningrad in 1983 and 1984, several Toshiba techinicians
eyed a Forest Line multiple axis propeller milling machine on the factory floor. Id. at 13.
9 See Report, supra note 2, at 12-13.
10 Id. at 14.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 15. "[A Toshiba salesman] explained that since the MBP 110 has too many simultane-
ously controllable axes, export to Russia would be contrary to Japanese export control regulations.
He explained to the Russians that only machines with no more than two simultaneously controlled
axes could be exported pursuant to the regulations." Id.
13 Id.
14 Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik ("Kongsberg") is a Norwegian company which manufactures nu-
merical controllers, including those that ultimately were used for the operation of the machines in
this case. Report, supra note 2, at i.
15 Id.
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were briefed about these developments.1 6
A few months later, in March 1980, Toshiba's President met with
the company's export sales manager who updated him on the status of
the negotiations with the Soviets. He warned the President that, in order
to close the sale, COCOM regulations would have to be violated.17 At
that time, the President issued an order "to do what had to be done to get
the business." 8 Entering into an elaborate scheme with Kongsberg,
which involved violations of COCOM, Norwegian and Japanese export
regulations, Toshiba began planning the illegal Soviet export. 9 Toshiba
and Kongsberg knew the entire transaction was illegal and, in fact, the
transaction took place despite the objection of some employees.2°
In order to circumvent Norwegian export regulations, Kongsberg
agreed to ship numerical controllers to Japan, falsely describing their
true capabilities. The plan called for Toshiba to reexport them to the
Soviet Union along with the milling machines."1 Under the scheme,
Kongsberg would alter the equipment subsequently in the Soviet
Union.22
Since the formal contract had to be included as an exhibit to the
export license application presented to the Japanese government, 3 the
parties entered into two distinct agreements: (1) a formal contract setting
out the sale of milling equipment permitted by COCOM restrictions, and
(2) a protocol setting forth the actual illegal arrangements designed to
provide the Soviets with the COCOM controlled equipment.
24
The export license application submitted to the Japanese govern-
ment contained a number of false statements, including representations
that the exports were not being sold exclusively to communist bloc coun-
tries25 and that the milling machines would not be used in manufacturing
defense-related products.26 Toshiba even submitted a document, under
16 Id.
17 Id. at 16.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 16-28.
20 A lower level "technical design section chief" opposed the illegal export as early as 1980.
When he protested the project, he was told that "it was his job to make sure the factory manufac-
tured the machines .... The employee concluded that he had no alternative but to follow orders."
Id. at 17.
21 Id. at 20.
22 Id. at 16.
23 Id. at 21.
24 Id. at 24. "[The protocol] was so worded as not to identify the contracting parties by name or
to describe the formal contract, so that if anyone were to examine the Protocol he would not be able
to identify what matter it referred to." Id.




its President's seal, falsely detailing the interrelation of the machines and
the export regulations and certifying that the exports were appropriate
under the regulations.27
Based upon this false and incomplete information, the Japanese gov-
ernment gave its approval for the exports.2 8 Toshiba began production
of the propeller milling machines shortly thereafter, with a contract price
of $17,435,000 for the four machines.2 9 They were exported in 1983 and
1984 and were fully operational by late 1984.30
B. The Second Sale
The aforementioned illegal transaction was not the end of Toshiba's
business with the Soviet Union. While that affair was underway,
Toshiba personnel were approached again by the Soviets concerning the
acquisition of additional propeller milling machines. 31 This time the
overture came from Prommashimport, another Soviet import agency,32
and the Soviets now were interested in a different milling machine known
as the MF model. Toshiba personnel also understood that exporting this
model to the Soviet Union was illegal.33
Once again, Toshiba negotiated with the Soviets and eventually
signed a contract and a separate protocol in the amount of $10,720,000
for the purchase of four MF Model machines. The pattern was the same.
The machines were falsely described and temporarily modified. Based
upon the false information submitted to the Japanese government, an ex-
port license was issued for the machinery. Subsequently, the machines
were installed in the Soviet Union in contravention of Japanese export
control regulations. 34 Although the second transaction did not involve
the use of Kongsberg, it otherwise bore striking similarities to the earlier
sale.35
27 Id. at 26.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 24. The orders were entered deceptively to avoid attracting attention when Toshiba's
sales statistics were reported to the Japan Machine Tool Builders Association. Id. at 26.
30 Id. at 28.
31 This overture occurred while they were in Moscow on business related to the first transaction.
Id. at 29.
32 The inquiry actually came from the same people who previously had been with
Techmashimport. Id.
33 Id. The MF model has five axes simultaneously controlled which is in excess of the two
controllable axes allowed for export to communist bloc countries. Id.
34 Id. at 31-32. Based upon the false information submitted to the Japanese government, an
export license again was issued for the machinery. Id. at 31.
35 Id. at 29-32. Toshiba decided this time to falsely describe the machines as "DFC 2022" ma-
chines in an effort to reduce suspicions by Japanese export officials. Id. at 30.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 9:277(1988)
C. Coverup and Exposure of Illicit Sales
The sale of such highly sensitive, controlled technology to the Sovi-
ets might never have been uncovered but for the disclosures of a disgrun-
tled employee and the thoroughness of the United States press. 6 In
April 1985, an employee of Wako Koeki (the small Japanese trading
company Toshiba had used in the Soviet business deals) resigned his po-
sition and disclosed the first illegal sale to COCOM.3 7  His action
prompted an investigation by the Japanese government.3 8 During the
course of the probe, many of Toshiba's top executives, including its Presi-
dent, engaged in a measured coverup of the facts which involved the de-
struction of documents and the dissemination of false and misleading
information to the authorities. 39 This scheme led the Japanese govern-
ment to conclude its initial investigation by accepting Toshiba's false
claims as true and finding that no export violation had transpired.'
The situation changed dramatically in March 1987, however, when
a story broke in the Washington Times that Toshiba had illegally shipped
its machinery to the Soviet Union.4 Once again Toshiba attempted to
conceal the truth from the authorities and generated memoranda bearing
the President's seal that contained false and deceptive information.42 In
the face of public scrutiny, the Japanese government filed charges against
Toshiba. The Japanese government executed search warrants at
Toshiba's business offices and at the homes of several Toshiba employees
and also conducted exhaustive interrogations of its employees. Follow-
ing this investigation, Toshiba's accounts about the first sale dis-
36 Id. at 33-35.
37 Id. at 33.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 33-34. "The top management team, consisting of the President, a Managing Director
and the Senior Managing Director, was informed during the course of the investigation about its
progress and the group's explanation to MITI [Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Indus-
try]. One of these three, the then President, was clearly in a position to assess the accuracy of these
explanations and had to know that the explanations to MITI were fundamentally untrue. He did
not, however, instruct the individuals involved to admit the truth to MITI." Id.
40 Id. at 34.
41 Id.
42 Id. "The memoranda contain[ed] a series of false and misleading statements, including:
(1) that the software Toshiba Machine Co. shipped in June 1984 had been Soviet software which
Toshiba Machine Co. was simply checking, in fact it was Toshiba Machine's software; (2) that the
machines had been installed in a factory of Electrosila, a heavy electric apparatus company, in fact
the installation was at a propeller milling plant in a Baltic factory; (3) that the April 17, 1981 proto-
col set forth guaranty arrangements for machines with two-axis simultaneous control, in fact the
protocol guaranteed that the machines would function on nine axis simultaneous control; and
(4) that it would be difficult to adjust the Kongsberg NC to provide for nine-axis simultaneous
control, in fact the adjustment had already been made and tested." Id.
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integrated, and the second transaction was discovered.43
D. Implications for United States National Security
These exports, coupled with previously acquired information and
technology," enable the Soviet Union to outfit its submarines with noise-
less propeller blades and its aircraft carriers with faster propellers.4 As
a consequence, the Soviet Union can improve the speed of its aircraft
carriers,46 as well as make its submarines less susceptible to detection.47
Knowledgeable sources contend that the exports have permitted the So-
viet Union to make technological advances they would have been unable
to achieve legitimately.48 Moreover, the pecuniary cost to the United
States to regain the edge in submarine technology may reach many bil-
lions of dollars.49
The Central Intelligence Agency contends that the Soviets gain
Western technology primarily for military aims and thereby save untold
resources in research and development costs to modernize their weap-
onry.5" Since maintaining a technological advantage over the Soviets is
critical to the security interests of the United States,51 the Toshiba-
43 Id. at 43-44.
44 Defense Department sources believe that the Soviets obtained information about the listening
frequency of U.S. submarine detectors from the Walker spy family and then sought out Western
technology for the machine tools required to produce quieter submarine propellers. Peterson,
Toshiba Aided Soviets with Sub Technology, Detroit News, April 28, 1987, reprinted in 133 CONG.
R c. S8991 (daily ed. June 30, 1987).
45 133 CONG. Rxc. S8995 (statement of Senator Jake Garn)(daily ed. June 30, 1987).
46 Id.
47 "Representative Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.), a member of the House Armed Services Commit-
tee, says the new propellers could allow the Soviet submarines to get so close to American shores
that their missles could reach the U.S. within 10 minutes." A Leak That Could Sink the U.S. Lead
in Submarines, Bus. WK., May 18, 1987, reprinted in 133 CONG. REC. S8991 (daily ed. June 30,
1987).
48 133 CONG. Rac. S8992 (statement of Senator Richard Shelby)(daily ed. June 30, 1987). "It
has been no secret in this city and across the country-indeed, in the world-that the Soviets wanted
desperately to start closing that research gap on submarine warfare. They knew that gap existed but
had not the technology to do anything about it." Id. at S9000 (statement of Senator Dale Bumpers).
49 Toshiba-Kongsberg Technology Diversion Case: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Finance
and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 100-182, at 10 (1987)(statement of Senator Alan J. Dixon)[hereinafter Toshiba-Kongsberg
Hearing]. "Defense Department officials have estimated the initial costs to replace equipment com-
promised by the sales to the Soviet Union at $1 billion to $5 billion, with billions more needed to
develop countertechnology." Crossette, 2 Leaders of Toshiba Resign, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1987, at
D3, col. 2.
50 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SOVIET AcQuismoN OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
(1982) reprinted in Transfer of Technology Hearings, supra note 4, at 7-23 (1982).
51 "The United States and its Allies traditionally have relied on the technological superiority of
their weapons to preserve a credible counterforce to the quantitative superiority of the Warsaw Pact.
But that technical superiority is eroding as the Soviet Union and its Allies introduce more and more
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Kongsberg case presents troubling implications for the United States.
The United States is now forced to redouble its research efforts in order
to recover the lost advantage at a time when the United States feels in-
creasing pressure to match the Soviets' military advances in other
areas.
5 2
III. RESPONSES TO THE ILLEGAL SALES
A. United States Reaction
In light of the impact the sales have had on national security, the
United States reacted to the disclosures with expected outrage. 3 Almost
immediately, Congress began investigating the matter and considering
possible legislative responses.* One early draft went so far as proposing
a permanent ban on imports from Toshiba, its parent Toshiba Corpora-
tion, and Kongsberg into the United States. 5
After months of debate, a presidential veto, 56 and more revisions,
the Congress finally passed the Omnibus Trade and Competiveness Act
of 1988 (the "Act") on August 23, 1988.1' In this Act, Congress passed
mandatory sanctions against the violators58 and comprehensive penalties
aimed at punishing present and future COCOM violators5 9 to ensure
compliance by foreign companies with COCOM controls.6"
The sanctions prohibit United States government contracting and
procurement with Toshiba and Kongsberg Trading Co. for three years. 1
During that period, the importation into the United States of all products
sophisticated weaponry-weapons that all too often are manufacturered with the direct help of
Western technology." CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 50, at 9.
52 For instance, the Soviets' military space program continues to overshadow that of the United
States. Carrington & Walcott, Pentagon Lags in Race to Match the Soviets in Rocket Launchers,
Wall St. J., July 12, 1988, at 1, col. 1. Serious doubt has been cast on the ability of the United States
to catch the Soviets even if it invests significant financial resources in the space program. Id. at 18,
col. 1.
53 Perhaps the most visible display of ire occurred when ten members of the House of Represent-
atives went out on the lawn of the capitol and shattered Toshiba radios with sledgehammers. When
Japan-Bashing Goes Too Far, Wall St. J., July 2, 1988, at 30, col. 1.
54 Toshiba-Kongsberg Hearing, supra note 49.
55 Omnibus Trade Act, Amend. No. 355, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S8989 (daily
ed. June 30, 1987).
56 Langley, supra note 1.
57 1988 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News (102 Stat.) at 1107. Although the President origi-
nally vetoed H.R. 3 on other grounds, the Reagan administration has expressed opposition in the
past to the Toshiba-Kongsberg sanctions. Fuerbringer, Senate Backs Import Ban in Soviet Trade
Deal, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1987, at Al, col. 2.
58 Omnibus Trade Act, 1988 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News (102 Stat.) at 1107.
59 Id. 1365-69.
60 Id. at 1364.
61 Id. at 1365.
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produced by Toshiba and Kongsberg Trading also is forbidden.62 The
sanctions against the parent firms, Toshiba Corporation and Kongsberg
Vaapenfabrik, are less harsh. They are limited to proscribing only gov-
ernment contracting and procurement for three years, but do not affect
the importation of their merchandise into the United States.63
The sanctions also reach beyond the Toshiba-Kongsberg case and
impose penalties on future violators of COCOM controls. They require
penalties for two to five years against any foreign entity that violates
COCOM strictures and thereby adversely influences the strategic balance
of power between the East and West.'4 However, the President is au-
thorized to waive the sanctions for the parent, affiliate, or subsidiary en-
tity of the violator, if (1) they are without fault and (2) their government
has an effective export control system.65 The Act also permits the Attor-
ney General to sue a COCOM violator for damages equal to the amount
necessary to restore the military readiness of the United States.66
B. Japanese-Norwegian Rejoinder
The Japanese and Norwegian governments initially responded to the
Toshiba-Kongsberg controversy by engaging in a number of highly pub-
licized actions. Both nations promised to review their internal export
control mechanisms to improve their capacity to uncover COCOM abus-
ers.67 Japan also formed a strategic goods export council to examine ex-
port licenses for sensitive articles to communist bloc countries.68
Shortly thereafter, Japan also offered to double the size of its export
licensing personnel and to increase its previously negligible financial con-
tribution to COCOM.6 9 Japan previously had only forty employees in its
MITI's Security Export Control Office to review some 200,000 export
license applications per year.70 The Japanese also invited export control
officials from the United States to help them develop more effective inter-
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1366-69.
65 Id. at 1367. Neveretheless, these sanctions "theoretically could ban McDonnell Douglas
Corp. from buying parts of the Harrier II jet from British Aerospace PLC if one of British Aero-
space's subsidiaries violates export laws." Lachica, White House Fights Congress on Trade Ban, Wall
St. J., April 15, 1988, at 25, col. 4.
66 Omnibus Trade Act, 1988 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News (102 Stat.) at 1107.
67 Toshiba-Kongsberg Hearing, supra note 49, at 6-9 (statement by E. Allan Wendt, U.S. Dept.
of State).
68 Id. at 6.
69 Lachica & Mossberg, Japanese Move to Appease U.S. in Toshiba Case, Wall St. J., July 17,
1987, at 16, col. I. Japan has been long criticized for its paltry contribution to COCOM, estimated
as low as $40,000. The United States pays about 25 percent of COCOM's budget. Id.
70 Id.
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nal controls.71 A few months later, Japan joined the United States in
promising "to work toward a major revitalization of COCOM, based on
improved public understanding of its objectives.",72 At the same time,
Japan also announced additional steps to tighten its internal export
controls.73
Japan's strategy was directed at blunting criticism in the United
States and avoiding harsh sanctions against Toshiba Corporation.74 That
plan also involved the indictment of Toshiba and its senior company offi-
cials, bans on Toshiba exports to Soviet bloc countries, and prohibitions
on exports by third parties that aided Toshiba.75 Norway also took simi-
lar punitive action against Kongsberg Trading Company.76
For its part, Toshiba Corporation engaged in a comprehensive pub-
lic relations campaign to assuage the United States public as well.
Toshiba Corporation's President and Board Chairman resigned, along
with the subsidiary's President and several other Board members and
officers.7 7 Toshiba Corporation ran advertisements in several major
newspapers, including the New York Times, Washington Post and the
Wall Street Journal, apologizing for the actions of its subsidiary.78 The
corporation also commissioned a comprehensive investigation and report
on the incident, prepared by a large United States law firm,79 and devel-
oped an internal quality control program to comply "with both the letter
and the spirit of the laws and regulations restricting the sale of strategic
products produced by Toshiba, its subsidiaries and affiliates."8"
The campaign seems to have worked for Toshiba Corporation. The
sanctions in the Act were watered down ultimately and the company's
consolidated earnings have risen significantly.81 Moreover, the zeal of
71 Id. That offer may be akin to the blind leading the blind considering the problems the United
States has failed to solve with its own controls. See Morehead, Export Controls: Who's Policing the
Enforcers, 13 N.C.J. INT'L LAW & CoM. REG. 307 (Spring 1988).
72 U.S., Japan Plan Revitalization of Watchdog Agency to Monitor Strategic Exports, Atlanta
Const., Oct. 8, 1987, at 20, col. 1.
73 Id.
74 Lachica & Mossberg, supra note 69.
75 Toshiba-Kongsberg Hearing, supra note 49, at 7-8.
76 Id. at 8.
77 Crossette, supra note 49, at D1, col 6; Kanabayashi, Toshiba Corp.'s 2 Top Officials Quit Their
Posts, Wall St. J., July 2, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
78 See Phillips, Toshiba Apologizes, ADVERTISING AGE, July 27, 1987, at 63.
79 Report, supra note 2.
80 TOSHIBA CORP., TOSHIBA STRATEGIC PRODUCTS CONTROL PROGRAM, Sept. 9, 1987 (avail-
able in the offices of Nw. J. OF INT'L L. & Bus.).
81 Armstrong, No Tears for Toshiba, Bus. WK., June 6, 1988, at 52. "Although its exports to the
U.S. fell 12% in the fiscal year ended last March, its consolidated earnings rose an estimated 60%, to
$440 million, on $28.5 billion in sales." Id.
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the Japanese to discipline Toshiba has dissipated. Although a Japanese
court found Toshiba and two of its former executives guilty, the govern-
ment imposed only a light fine on the company and suspended sentences
on the individuals.82
IV. CURRENT STATUS OF MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROLS
The Toshiba-Kongsberg case unmistakenly demonstrates that there
are serious problems with the efficacy of multilateral export controls im-
plemented by COCOM. As easy as it was for violators in this case to
evade COCOM controls, one can only guess how many other illegal ex-
ports to communist bloc countries have escaped detection. A panel of
experts at the National Academy of Sciences recently concluded that So-
viet acquisitions of Western technology are "massive, well financed, and
frequently effective." 83 An estimated 70% of the items the Soviets target
and eventually acquire in the West are subject to some form of national
security export control.84
Furthermore, this case has reminded the United States that protect-
ing its national security depends not only upon the success of its own
unilateral controls, but also upon the effectiveness of COCOM controls."
Since the United States is no longer the only developed nation capable of
producing sophisticated articles,86 it must depend upon COCOM and its
member nations to prevent leakage of technology to the communist bloc.
Unfortunately, COCOM is not currently equipped to shoulder this
responsibility.
A. The Structure and Function of COCOM
COCOM was established to improve control over the acquisition of
strategic goods and technology by communist bloc nations,87 while en-
82 Haberman, Japan Fines Toshiba Unit for Sales to Soviet, N.Y. Times, March 23, 1988, at D14,
col. 4.
83 NAT'L ACADEMY, supra note 7, at 41.
84 Id. at 42.
85 Id. at 135.
86 Note, National Security Protection: The Critical Technologies Approach to US Export Control
of High-Level Technology, 15 J. INT'L LAW & ECON. 575, 579 (1981). The Commerce Department
estimates that by 1994 the United States' control, of the world's significant technologies will have
dropped from a previous high of 70% to only 30%. Richey, Controlling U.S. High-Tech Exports,
Christian Sci. Monitor, May 16, 1984, at 16.
87 COCOM controls are applied to the Soviet Union, Eastern Eurpoean countries, North Korea,
Vietnam and the People's Republic of China. Hunt, Multilateral Cooperation in Export Controls-
The Role of COCOM, 14 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 1285, 1289 n.19 (1983).
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hancing trade among member nations.88 Multilateral export controls
seek to ensure that Western lead-time in technology, which provides
qualitative military superiority, is sufficient to offset the East's quantita-
tive advantage on the battlefield.8 9 COCOM carries out its function by
developing strategic standards for controls, drawing up lists of controlled
items, considering individual exceptions from the controls, and coordi-
nating enforcement efforts between member nations.90
Most of COCOM's activity centers on the International List which
the organization uses to catalogue the dual-use items. Dual-use items are
items which have both civilian and military applications. 91 Although the
list is not published, it is the cornerstone of the controls dispensed by
member nations.92 Controlled items may only be exported to an embar-
goed end user if the risk is deemed acceptable by COCOM.93
B. Deficiencies in COCOM Controls
COCOM operates as an informal and voluntary accord between its
member nations.94 Each nation is under no treaty obligations and has
the right to operate consistently with its own legal, administrative, and
policy determinations.95 Moreover, agreements on any issue must be
reached by unanimous consent.96
With such a loose framework, it is not suprising to find that individ-
ual members have contrasting approaches to COCOM which create se-
vere impediments to the effectiveness of the controls.97 For instance, the
United States disseminates data to the public about COCOM and its du-
ties; the French barely acknowledge the existence of COCOM in their
governmental reports.98 The Europeans and the Japanese view East-
88 Berman & Garson, supra note 4, at 834-44; Note, Failures in the Interagency Administration
of National Security Export Controls, 19 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 537, 548-49 (1987).
89 Export Controls: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Finance and Monetary Policy of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 100-107, at 144
(1987)(statement of Lawrence Brady, Former Asst. Sec. of Commerce of Export Administration).
90 Note, supra note 88, at 548; Transfer of Technology Hearings, supra note 4, at 157.
91 Note, supra note 88, at 548-49. There also are two other lists: the International Atomic En-
ergy List and the International Munitions List. Hunt, supra note 87, at 1288.
92 Transfer of Technology Hearings, supra note 4, at 157.
93 Hunt, supra note 87, at 1291. "Such a determination can be based upon a verifiable dedication
of the item to civilian use, or upon a judgment that no strategically significant transfer of technology
will occur through access to embargoed equipment." Id.
94 Hunt, supra note 87, at 1287.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Aeppel, The Evolution of Multilateral Export Controls: A Critical Study of the COCOM Re-




West trade as economically essential, while the United States believes
such trade often impairs national security.9 9
Approaching East-West trade more circumspectly, the United
States describes strategic technology broadly, ties political and business
relationships together, °° and uses export controls to achieve foreign pol-
icy objectives.'O° In contrast, the other COCOM members, heavily influ-
enced by European and Japanese business leaders, 10 2 argue that national
security also depends upon economic power.103 They are skeptical of the
political motives of the United States in pressing for harsher export con-
trols and point to the high number of exceptions the United States regu-
larly seeks to COCOM controls for its own industries."°
This debate, at times, seems endless. The United States claims that it
is acting more honestly than other COCOM members by securing the
requisite exceptions.105 Indeed that argument is supported not only by
statistical data,106 but also by the Toshiba-Kongsberg case and similar
examples where parties either bypassed COCOM procedures or became
involved in diversions or transshipments of goods through third party
countries. 107
Not only is there no consensus on what constitutes acceptable tech-
nology transfer to the East, but also COCOM's limited infrastructure
prevents effective enforcement of any rules agreed upon by the members.
99 Id. at 112-13. The United States outlook is summarized in an excerpt from a 1983 RAND
Report: "The danger is not so much the possibility of sudden and disastrous give-aways, but rather
that high-technology trade may help the Soviets to upgrade over the longer term the traditionally
neglected civilian' industries that will provide broad, infrastructural support for new weapons sys-
tems tommorrow." Id. at 113, (quoting T. GusTAFSON, SELLING THE RUSSIANS THE ROPE vi
(1981).
100 Aeppel, supra note 97, at 115. "The American style has been to distinguish not only between
the Soviets and the Chinese, but also among the various Eastern European states. In general, the
Romanians and Hungarians are treated better than other Soviet bloc states by the U.S. because of
their relative independence from the Soviet Union in economic and foreign policy." Id.
101 A. STENT, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE SOVIET UNION 83 (1983).
102 "European and Japanese business leaders command much more political clout than their
American counterparts. As a result, firms in Japan and Europe have had much more influence over
the crafting of export controls." Aeppel, supra note 97, at 115.
103 A. STENT, supra note 101, at 98. "Technology transfer to the East, so this goes, is a factor for
stability to be balanced against the potentially destabilizing economic effects of a continued comple-
mentary trade structure between East and West." Id.
104 The United States has been responsible for approximately 50% of the exception applications
in the past. Aeppel, supra note 97, at 120.
105 Id.
106 "According to this view, the fact that the U.S. lodged 50 percent of the exception requests in
the late 1970s, while accounting for a mere 15 percent of the end products destined for the East,
suggests that a good deal of East-West trade originating in Europe or Japan is simply circumventing
the COCOM mechanism." Id.
107 Id. at 121.
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COCOM lacks investigative resources or law enforcement authority and
depends upon each member to enforce export controls.10 8 It possesses an
inadequate staff to manage its multilateral administrative functions. 109
Even though the United States recently succeeded in obtaining un-
specified commitments from other members to bolster COCOM's en-
forcement mechanism and increase its inspection personnel,1 10 no
sustained effort has been made to use the Toshiba-Kongsberg case as a
basis for transforming COCOM into a formal entity with enforcement
authority. Enforcement problems continue to be exacerbated by the al-
most nonchalant attitude many COCOM countries have toward export
controls."' The quality of individual national enforcement is uneven,
with only the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and
France showing serious interest in the enforcement of controls and in-
creasing multilateral cooperation.'
12
The development of a cohesive multilateral policy is inhibited by the
resentment many European countries have toward unilateral reexport
controls imposed by the United States on its products and technology.
They believe this is an improper expansion of its domestic laws to other
nations' 1 3 and suspect that the United States uses export controls to pro-
tect and enhance commercial profits for United States firms.1 14 The
other COCOM nations also argue that there should be a presumption in
favor of exports.' They criticize the size and reach of both the United
States' unilateral controls" 6 and the COCOM controls." 7 These coun-
tries maintain that the list of controlled goods and technology surpasses
the practical ability of COCOM and its member states to monitor, and
this list reduces trustworthiness in and causes careless disregard for ex-
108 Hunt, supra note 87, at 1294.
109 Id. at 1287. "The organization operates on a virtual shoe-string budget, with annual allot-
ments of less than $500,000 and under 14,000 square feet of office space." Aeppel, supra note 97, at
116, quoting U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONTROL PROGRAM: A RE-
PORT TO THE 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., 1984, 52 (1984).
110 Markham, Revised Curbs on East-Bloc Trade, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1988, at Dl, col. 1;
Lachica & Browning, West Tightens Technology-Export Rules But Shortens List of Controlled Prod-
ucts, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1988, at 18, col. 2.
111 See NAT'L ACADEMY, supra note 7, at 190.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 184-92. To prevent transshipment to an unauthorized end user, approval must be ob-
tained from the Commerce Department to reexport from one country to another American goods or
technology which have previously been exported pursuant to a validated license. 15 C.F.R. § 374.1-
9 (1987).
114 NAT'L ACADEMY, supra note 7, at 186.
115 Id. at 184.
116 The items subject to U.S. controls are listed in 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 (1987).





V. STRATEGIES FOR UPGRADING MULTILATERAL CONTROLS
Despite its short-term damage to United States national security, the
Toshiba-Kongsberg case, if properly utilized, may provide the impetus
for major reforms in multilateral export controls. Certainly some posi-
tive steps already have been taken.I 9 Nevertheless, if the West is to suc-
cessfully impede the Soviet Union and other communist bloc countries in
their quest for strategic technology, fundamental changes must be made
in the structure and function of COCOM and in the member nations'
views about export controls.
Obtaining an agreement on a common approach to East-West trade
policy will turn on the capability and drive of COCOM members to con-
vert the Toshiba-Kongsberg case into a rallying point for systemic
changes in the existing export control regime. The need for a newly de-
fined consensus in the West that supports both military security and eco-
nomic prosperity never has been greater. As the European community
moves closer to the 1992 deadline for a unified economic market,1 20 so
must the West agree upon a common approach to export controls.
A. Unilateral Reprisal Counterproductive
For success to be realized, the United States must move beyond uni-
lateral retaliation in the Toshiba-Kongsberg case and toward multilateral
cooperation. 121 Unfortunately, despite some limited achievement, 22 the
overall reaction of the United States to this controversy has been
counterproductive to improved multilateral cooperation. The unilateral
sanctions mandated by the Act and now in effect for present and future
COCOM violations have met with objection from both Japan 123 and the
European community.'
24
Several COCOM countries have characterized the sanctions as an
inappropriate, "extraterritorial" application of United States law to for-
118 Id. at 139.
119 See supra notes 67-76, 110, and accompanying text.
120 Riemer, Laying the Foundation for a Great Wall of Europe, Bus. WK., Aug. 1, 1988, at 40-41.
121 Some aspects of the Omnibus Trade Act sought to do this, such as the policy recommenda-
tions for improving multilateral cooperation contained in § 2446. 1988 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin.
News (102 Stat.) at 1350-51.
122 See supra notes 67-76, 110, and accompanying text.
123 First Reagan-Takeshita Summit Meeting Yields Some Progress on Trade Dispute, 5 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 58, 59 (Jan. 20, 1988).
124 European Community, Member States Object to Senate's Toshiba-Kongsberg Sanctions, 5
INT'L TRADE REP. 136-37 (Feb. 3, 1988)[hereinafter European Community Objects].
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eign violators' 25 that operate in an inequitable fashion outside the frame-
work of internationally accepted trading rules.' 26  Seven European
countries, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Portugal, also have objected to the sanctions on
security grounds. 12 7 In particular, the British and French believe unilat-
eral action by the United States will weaken COCOM cooperation,
thereby reducing the sharing of information and joint enforcement action
by member states.1 28
B. Gaining a Consensus for Meaningful Multilateral Reforms
Obviously, the foregoing arguments have some merit. The time has
come for all COCOM members to begin appreciating the need for a co-
herent and cohesive East-West trade policy that balances the twin goals
of protecting strategic goods and technology from the Soviet Union, and
opening new economic markets in the East. The United States surely
will not move beyond unilateral controls and sanctions unless other
COCOM members agree on meaningful reforms aimed at improving
multilateral controls.
Despite natural tendencies in international politics to delay resolu-
tion of difficult and controversial subjects, the Toshiba-Kongsberg case
presents compelling evidence that the time for action has arrived. The
following reforms appear to the author to offer solutions worthy of
consideration.
1. Restructuring of COCOM
The organization of COCOM must be formalized and the participat-
ing states have to relinquish their right to act independently in matters of
export control. COCOM's structure should be boosted to a level where it
is capable of making export control decisions as a governing body rather
than through its member governments. Of course, that means each
member will have to recognize COCOM's existence formally and provide
125 Other nations have criticized the United States penchant for expanding its export laws beyond
the borders before. Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Act of 1979
Under International and American Law, 81 Micn. L. REV. 1308 (1983); Abbott, Linking Trade to
Political Goals: Foreign Policy Export Controls in the 1970's and 1980's, 65 MINN. L. REV. 739, 839-
43 (1981).
126 European Community Objects, supra note 124, at 137.
127 Id.
128 Id. They argue that other countries will be reluctant to cooperate with COCOM or the
United States out of fear that their own companies will be subject to indiscriminate sanctions. They
contend consensus multilateral action against violators is the preferred method. Id.
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sufficient financial resources to create a licensing and enforcement staff
capable of monitoring export controls.
While national programs should continue to be upgraded and shoul-
der primary responsibility for implementing multilateral regulations,
COCOM must have the staff capable of reviewing strategic export con-
trol applications to the East. That includes the means to assess the accu-
racy of end users and the information about specific exports. COCOM
also needs an enforcement apparatus, with investigative agents, to over-
see the movement of strategic goods and technology.
2. Elimination of Unilateral Controls
The National Academy of Sciences study12 9 found that the United
States has reacted to COCOM's inadequacies by "going it alone."' 3 ° The
United States, in order to hasten the rise of COCOM unity, must promise
to eliminate export and reexport controls on end users in COCOM coun-
tries 131 and to stop imposing unilateral controls on exports to communist
bloc countries. The United States' present approach fails because it
falsely assumes that indirect United States controls are more effective
than direct host government controls and that equally sophisticated tech-
nology does not exist outside the United States.'32 Unilateral controls
will become increasingly ineffective when other COCOM nations match
the United States in technological skill and the "national origin of a
product" becomes increasingly impossible to determine. 133 Thus, export
controls are doomed to failure unless fully endorsed by COCOM.
134
Moving toward a meaningful multilateral program of export con-
trols does not necessarily preclude unilateral action by the United States
on rare occassions. Foreign policy controls 135 may be appropriate in cir-
129 NAT'L ACADEMY, supra note 7.
130 Id. at 139.
131 The Act significantly reduced the reexport controls placed on COCOM countries by the Ex-
port Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404. See Omnibus Trade Act, 1988 U.S. Code Cong.
and Admin. News (102 Stat.) at 1347.
132 NAT'L ACADEMY, supra note 7, at 139.
133 Blumenthal, The World Economy and Technological Change, 66 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 529, 537
(1988). "As a smaller number of large players are able to organize their operations on a world-wide
scale, their products cease to be truly American or German or Japanese. Parts, components, sub-
sytems, products and services are intermingled and exchanged in ways that render debates as to the
final product's national orgin not much to the point." Id.
134 Even if the United States arguably has the best technology, second best technology will be
available to the Soviets in other COCOM nations. Therefore, unless our technology is vastly supe-
rior in a particular area, the Soviets still gain a strategic advantage even if forced to use alternative
COCOM sources.
135 The Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2405, permits the imposition of export controls
for political reasons. For a thorough examination of the political, economic, and cultural conse-
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cumstances where the United States perceives a major international issue
to be very important. Nevertheless, the United States must -learn to dif-
ferentiate between such controls which by definition may succeed if im-
posed unilaterally'3 6 and those aimed at preventing the dissemination of
critical technology to the East.13 7 The United States can expect coopera-
tion by COCOM only for the latter type of controls.
3. Reduction of the International List
If a unified Western policy on export controls is to evolve, every
COCOM member must make concessions and reach a consensus on what
goods and technology should be controlled. The COCOM partners must
individually and collectively contribute to the development of a reason-
able control list equally supported and enforced by every member.13 8
The United States and other COCOM members must agree to develop a
list of controls based solely upon the ability of the item or technology to
affect the East-West balance of power."3 9
To successfully negotiate a control list within these parameters will
require concessions both in style and substance by the United States and
other COCOM members. The United States must engage in flexible talks
rather than high pressure tactics with its allies."4 It must argue for plac-
ing multilateral controls on an item or technology only on the ground
that United States or Western security is at issue; the United States must
avoid injecting foreign policy matters into the debate. Restrictions on
strategic goods and technology will be accepted by COCOM partners
only if they are based upon documented information linking the controls
with Soviet military deficiencies. 4 '
quences of such controls, see deKieffer, Foreign Policy Export Controls: A Proposal for Reform, I 1
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 39 (1986).
136 "For example, unilateral U.S. controls on items used to commit gross violations of interna-
tionally recognized human rights or to support acts of international terrorism disassociate the
United States from offending governments. And Washington can achieve such a goal even if other
supplier countries provide those items that the United States denies." Root, Trade Controls That
Work, 56 FOREIGN POL'Y 61, 73 (1984).
137 "[T]he COCOM controls are intended to focus only on national security quite narrowly de-
fined. The United States has taken a much more expansive view of what types of goods and technol-
ogy pose a military risk and has sought to use COCOM to punish Soviet behavior for essentially
foreign policy reasons." NAT'L ACADEMY, supra note 7, at 144-45.
138 Id. at 141.
139 The Act sets forth procedures for reviewing the International Control List in order to remove
items which no longer need to be listed. 1988 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News (102 Stat.) at
1350-51.
140 See Root, supra note 136, at 76.
141 The National Academy of Sciences study also contended that the effectiveness of the multilat-
eral process would improve if each nation's delegation to COCOM had balanced representation from




At the same time, while differing positions on whether particular
items should be placed on the control list may create healthy debate, all
COCOM members must share a consistent philosophy about export con-
trols. In a viable multilateral control program there is no room for those
COCOM countries that give only lip service to export controls. Every
member state must rededicate itself to developing and enforcing a list of
controls on strategic goods and technology that have military signifi-
cance to the Soviet Union. The best opportunity for effective controls
rests with shared responsibility in a common mission.
V. CONCLUSION
As we move toward a global economy, where nations grow more
economically interdependent on each other, foreign trade will play 'an
increasingly vital part in the equation for Western security. On the other
hand, the West must take steps to deny the Soviet Union and the com-
munist bloc strategic products and technology that influence the balance
of power. Only by approaching this aspect of East-West trade at a multi-
lateral level can the West expect to develop export controls that achieve
an effective compromise between the dual objectives of Western security
and economic vitality.
contingent, the other COCOM members primarily are represented by trade and economic experts.
NAT'L ACADEMY, supra note 7, at 159. If agreement is to be reached on controlling exports, the
delegations must be represented by advocates of trade and defense.
